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A class of two-person nonzero sum games where the strategy choices are 
constrained in some form for each player is analyzed here to show the equivalent 
nonlinear programs which must be solved for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
This equilibrium solution is shown in appropriate cases to lead to comple- 
mentary eigenvalue problems, which hare applications in normal solutions of 
stochastic LP models and optimal design problems in linear regression theory. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For a two-person nonzero sum game it is known [S, 151 that a Nash equili- 
brium point, if it exists, can be equivalently characterized by the optimal 
solution of a quadratic programming problem with linear constraints. The 
object here is to show that for a certain class of constrained games, where the 
strategies are in some sense restricted, the Nash equilibrium solution leads to an 
equivalent pair of complementary eigenvalue problems. In applied work [l, 31 
two types of constraints on the strategy vectors have been discussed. For 
instance, in chance-constrained games [l] strategies are assumed partially 
controllable i.e. actual strategy used (2) by player 1 is a linear combination of a 
preassigned strategy (x0) and a chosen strategy (x) so that 3 = ws + (I - W) x0 
where the scalar weight w is fixed; likewise for player II j = 17’ + (I - r) 3pO , 
where r is a fixed scalar weight. The interpretation of the preassigned vectors x0 , 
yO is that they variously involve risk, uncertainty or competition. ,4 second 
interpretation, due to Isaacs [4] argues that x0 , ~7~ are the initial probability 
estimates in terms of the respective subjective probability distributions of the 
two players. The decision problem before each is how much to perturb his 
initial probability estimate to obtain his maximum expected payoff such that it 
is consistent with the optimal strategies played by the other player. 
In the present development the second interpretation is used in the following 
sense: the n-dimensional strategy x of player I is assumed drawn from a sub- 
jective probability distribution with mean lvO and variance-covariance matrix U 
and likewise, the m-dimensional strategy vector y of player II is drawn from a 
distribution with mean yO and variance-covariance matrix I;‘. Assuming U, V 
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symmetric and positive definite we introduce the multivariate distance [9] 
measure D’(.) as follows 
Lqx, x0; U) = (x - x0)’ U-1(x - x0) (1.1) 
D”(Y, yo; v = (Y - Yo)’ V-l(y - Yo). (‘4 
Let r-l and B be the payoff matrices to players I and II respectively. The two 




p’ u-p = 1 
(1.3) 
Player II: 
subject to (1.4) 
where p == s - so , q = y - y. and prime denotes transpose. Note that p, q 
are modified strategy vectors, hence it is not required that p 3 0, q > 0. How- 
ever, if (x0, yo) = (0,O) in a normalized set of coordinates, then we would 
require p 3 0, q 3 0 as additional constraints for (1.3) and (1.4). ,4 Nash 
equilibrium [8] point for the modified game (1.3), (1.4) is defined by a pair of 
strategies p”, q” where the objectives of (1.3) and (1.4) are simultaneously 
fulfilled i.e. 
p”‘Aqo = m;x{p’AqO ] p’U-lp = I} (1.5) 
p”‘Bqo = m*z{pO’Bq 1 q’ V-lq = 1) (1.6) 
the interpretation of the constraints of (1.3) and (1.4) is that the chosen strategies 
x, y must be close to Y 0 , y. respectively in terms of the distance measures (I. 1) 
and (1.2). 






x’ U-lx = I 
(1.7) 






y’py = 1 
Y b 0, X>,O 
where there are no initial probability estimates x,, , y,, preassigned. In this game 
the strategy vectors x, y are not normalized so that 2Yxi , ZyJ need not add up to 
unity. However, if an optimal pair (x, y) of solutions exist for (1.7), (1.8), then 
there must exist a normalized pair (9, 3) where 
(1.9) 
In the next game, the objectives of (1.7), (1.8) are considered more generally 
and the modified strategy vectors p, q are subject to preassigned distances i.e., 
Player I: 
subject to 
m;x P’dP, 4) 




k >O, P>,O 
S(PY 4) = 4 - &CP, a > 0. 




In this game, the payoff function for each player may be interpreted as profits 
which depend partly on the strategy chosen by the other player. This is the 
framework of Cournot’s duopolistic market model [14, 161, except that the 
constraints, for fixed values of k, Y imply the implicit costs of perturbations of x 
from x0 and y from y,, . Through parametric variations of k and Y, each player 
may estimate his expected payoff from perturbing his initial probability estimates. 
For this game (1. lo), (1.11) it will be assumed that C, D are nonsingular matrices 
of orders n and m respectively, while 4, B are arbitrary real matrices of dimen- 
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sions II by vz. It is clear that if the constraints p’p < 8, $y -i r are not binding 
and C = CT-l, D == 1’-l the game model (l.lO), (1.11) would be equivalent to 
the constrained game (1.3), (1.4). H ence a Cournot-Nash equilibrium point for 
the modified game (1. lo), (1.11) may be defined by a pair of strategies (p”, @), 
where the objectives of ( 1.10) and (1. I 1) are simultaneously fulfilled i.e., 
p”k(pO, q”) = m;x(p’g(p, q”) I p’p < k; k > 01 (1.12) 
q”‘h(p”, 4”) = mp{@h(p”, 9) 1 p’Q < r; r > 01 (1.13) 
where the functions g(p, q), h(p, Q) are defined before in (1.10). (1.1 I). 
The aim of this work is to state the quadratic programming problems that 
have to be solved in case of these constrained games to obtain a Nash equilibrium 
point and to show that for this class of nonzero sum constrained games there 
exist an equivalent pair of complementary eigenvalue problems in appropriate 
cases. Section two derives some theoretical results, followed by a section on 
potential applications in economics, statistical estimation and stochastic linear 
programming [5. 11, 121. 
2. EQUIVALENT EIGENVALUE PROBLEMS 
The three constrained games above are each assumed to have Nash equili- 
brium points [8] which are defined by (1.5), (1.6), or by (1.12), (1.13) and the 
modified strategy vectors p, 4 of players I and II are assumed to have finite 
dimensions 11 and nz respectively, satisfying the usual normalizing conditions i.e., 
L’x, := Zy, = 1, I 3 0, y 2 0. Then the following results can be stated and 
proved: 
THEOREM 1 (Equivalence Theorem). If the i\!ash epu&ktlm point (p”, Q’) 
exists for the game (I .3), (I .4) then there must exist scalars A, p such that (p, q. A, p) 
procides optimal solution of the following nonlinear progsam: 
subject to 
m;x,‘~~e p’(A + B) 4 - (A + /I) 
, I’ 
(2.1) 
dq - 2AFp = 0 
B’p _ &L”q z 0 
p'U-lp = 1 = $r'-lq 
A(p’U-lp - 1) = 0 
/L(q’Pq - 1) = 0 
(2.2) 
where X and TV are scalar multipliers associated with the constraints of (1.3) and 
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(1.4) respectively. The values of 2X and 2~ at the maximum, 2X’ and 2u” equal the 
expected payofs to players I and II respectively. Further, the optimal pair (p”, q”) 
must satisf-v the complementary eigenvalue problems in 6’ = 4+ 
zchere the value of 0 at the maximum, 8O = (2h0) (2~~) must be taken. 
COROLLARY 1.1. If the variance-covariance wiatrices Cl, T,* are homoscedastic, 
i.e., l7 = aCt51, r = ~~~1, then the complementary eigenvalue problems (2.3) 
become 
[cT,%,~AB’ - @I] po = 0 = [a,%,.?~‘~~ - @I] qn (2.4) 
z?here p’J’p0 = aU2 and qo’q” = u<,?. 
~OROLLARS 1.2. If the constraints of (I .3) and (I .4) are modified as p’Ci-p 
< 1, p >, 0 and q’ I--1q < 1, q 3 0 such that U, P are assumed diagonal and the 
payoff matrices -4, B assumed nonnegative, then the equivalent nonlinear program 
abalogous to (2.1), (2.2) become 
rn;;imize p’(S + B) q - (A + u) 
I 3 3 
subject to 
p’l?‘p < 1; q’1’-lq < 1 
A( 1 - p’ c-p) = 0 = p( 1 - q’ Ti-14) 
P, 4, k P >, 0 
where the values of A, TV at the maximum ho, p” are nonnegative and 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
@“(A + B) q” - 2(h0 + CL”) = 0. (2.7) 
-#so, if the ;Vash equilibrium pair (~0, qo) e.vist such that the associated scalars X0, 
~0 are positive, then there must exist at least one B which is the common eigenvalue 
of AI’B’U and B’UA b’ such that it is positive and the associated eigenvectors are 
nonnegative. 
Proof. Interpreting A, p as multipliers associated with the constraints of 
(1.3) and (1.4) respectively, the conditions (2.2) are necessary for any Nash 
equilibrium point (p”, 4”) defined by (1.5) and (1.6) if it exists. Hence, by 
assumption the set S of (p, q, A, CL) satisfying (2.2) cannot be empty. Further, 
for any (p, q, A, p) E S we must have 
~‘(4 + B) q - h - /I < p”‘( A + B) q” - ho - po 
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since (~0, no) is an optimal pair with the associated optimal values X0, p” for the 
multipliers. Further, from (2.1) and (2.2) we obtain: 
pO’(A + B) q” - A - p < A0 + p” P9 
hence 
Further, since f = p’(A + B) q - h - p is a continuous function for all t E S 
where t = (p, 4, A, CL), there exists a nonempty neighborhood N(tO) around 
to = (p”, q”, ho, PO) for which (2.8) holds. Let J be the set obtained from the 
intersection of two sets S and N(t”). Then for all t, to E J we have 
lnJcp’(llr + B) q - A - p == pO’(A + B) qo - A0 - /Lo = x0 $ I*“. (2.9) 
Conversely, let to satisfy (2.9). Th en since the set J is nonempty, there exists at 
least one t E J such that $(A + B) q - X - p = ho + p”. Hence for to to be a 
maximum in J one must have 
pO’(A $ B) qo - A0 - /Lo = ho + /Lo 
Using this with (2.2) one gets p”‘Aqo - 2h0 = 0, p”‘Bqo - 2p” = 0. Hence 
to E J satisfies the maximizing conditions for the Nash equilibrium defined by 
(1.5) and (1.6). 
Furthermore, on combining the relations of (2.2) at the equilibrium pair 
(p”, q”) we obtain the generalized eigenvalue problems (2.3). In case C, I’ are 
homoscedastic, these become ordinary eigenvalue problems (2.4) in the eigen- 
value 80 = 4A”po. 
By following a similar argument, Corollary 1.2 can be proved, where the 
maximum eigenvalue 80 and the associated eigenvectors which are nonnegative 
exist, because the matrices A VB’ U, B’ UA V are by assumption nonnegative and 
the Perron-Frobenius theorem [lo] is applicable. Q.E.D. 
Remark 1. If m = n, c’ = Y = I and the ranks of the matrices (AB’ -- @I) 
are m - 1, where 80 = 4&O is the maximal eigenvalue, then the Nash equili- 
brium point (pa, qo) is also the global maximum. 
Remark 2. If in the constrained game (1.7) (1.8) Nash-equilibrium mixed 
strategy vectors ~0, yo exist, then they must satisfy the complementary eigen- 
value problems 
[A I-B’ - B”c:-l] .I? zzz 0 = [B’UA _ @‘V-I] yo 
where 80 is the masimal of the eigenvalues 8 = 4ht( of the generalized eigenvalue 
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problem. Further, if the ranks of the matrices (AB’ - PI), (B’A - eO1) are 
m - 1, then the Nash equilibrium (x0, yO) is also the global maximum. Further- 
more, if U = V = I, m = n and the two matrices AB’, B’A are each with 
positive elements, irreducible and primitive [lo], then the maximum eigenvalue 
80 associated with the Nash-equilibrium point (x0, 17”) is positive and unique. 
THEOREM 2. If the Cournot-Nash equilibrium point (p”, q”) de$ned by (1.12) 
(1.13) exists for the constrained game (1 .lO), (1.1 I), then there must exist scalar 
values ho, p” such that (p”, q”, ho, PO) satisfy the foZlowing conditions 
AqO - 2arcpo - 2hOpO < 0 
B’PO - 2/3Dq” - 2u”q” < 0 
pO’Aq0 - 2cipO’CpO - 2hOpO’pO = 0 
p”‘Bqo - 2/3q”‘Dq” - 2$‘qO’qo = 0 (3.1) 
p”‘p” < k; q”‘qo < Y; h”(k - pop”) = 0 = /.&‘(r - qo’qo) 
PO 3 0, q” 3 0, x0 > 0, /Lo > 0. 
Further, the Coumot-Nash equilibrium point must be a solution of the following 
nonlinear program: 
m;x$r$e ~‘(~4 + B) q - uP’CP - Pq’Dq - (Ak + pr) 
2 > 1 
subject to 
P’P < k; 4’4 d r 
h(k - p’p) = 0 = /~(r - q’q) 
P, 4, A I” 2 0 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
the values of X, u at the maximum, ho, u” are such that the expected payoffs to 
players I and II are 
q”‘Cpo + 2h”k and /3q”‘Dqo + ~/LOY (3.4) 
which reduces to 2X, 2p” respectively, if or=p=Qandk=l =r.Further,ifit 
holds that the equilibrium point (PO, q”) satisJes the first two constraints of (3.1) as an 
equality, then the equilibrium must satisfy a pair of complementary eigenvalue pro- 
blems 
[A(,OZ + PO)-’ B’ - 4(urC + hoI)] PO = 0 
[B’(hOZ + sC))l-3 - 4(/3D + ~LOZ)] q” = 0 
(3.5) 
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('OROLLARY 2.1. If X0, @ are zero in the sense that the releeant constraints 
are not binding and the IYash equilibrium vectors p”, q” exist such that the jirst two 
constraints of (3.1) hold as equality, then the equilibrium vectors must satisfy a pair 
of complementary eigenvalue problems 
[AD- 1B’ - K] p” = 0 --- [B’C-‘A - eLq q” (3.6) 
where 0 = k/3. Similarly, if a, /3 are zero but A”, $’ are positive such that the 
Jirst two constraints of (3.1) hold as equalitv at equilibrium, then the complementar> _ 
eigenfqalue problems become 
(&I - BI) po = (Iii’,-;1 - eI) q” (3.7) 
where 0 = Up. 
COROLLARY 2.2. If there were no nonnegativity constraints p -3 0, q > 0 such 
that the jirst two constraints of (3. I) hold as equality at (p”, q”) and the following 
Hessian matrix H 
(3.8) 
is negative semi-dejnite, then the necessary conditions (3. I) are also s@cient.for the 
Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. The conditions (3.1) are necessary for the Cournot-Nash euilibrium 
defined by (I. 12), (1.13) and this follows from the Kuhn-Tucker theorem [6, 121. 
Combining the third and fourth equations of (3.1) along with h(k - p’p) = 
0 = p(r - q’q) leads to the equivalent nonlinear program (3.2), (3.3). The line 
of proof used in Theorem 1 may then be used to characterize the equilibrium 
point (p”, q”, X0, PO) and the expected payoff to the two players given by (3.4). 
If the first two inequalities of (3.1) hold as equality, then the pair of eigenvalue 
problems (3.5) or (3.6) or (3.7) follow. Furthermore, if the Hessian matrix H 
defined in (3.8) is negative semi-definite for fixed position scalars iy, fl then the 
objective function (3.2) is concave; hence by Kuhn-Tucker theorem the neces- 
sary conditions are also sufficient. Q.E.D. 
Similarly with respect to the constrained game (I .7), (1.8) we may state the 
following. 
THEOREM 3. If the Nash equilibrium point (x0, y”) exists for the game (I .7). 
(I .8), then there must exist scalars A, TV such that (x, y, A, cl) provides an optimal 
solution of the following nonlinear program: 
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(4.1) 
subject to 
where the values of A, p at the maximum, ho, p” are such that the expected payoff to 
p/a?-ers I and II equal 2X0, 2p” respectively. Furthermore 
.YO’(d f B) yo - A0 - /Lo = x0 + /Lo 
If at the equilibrium point, the jrst two constraints of (4.2) hold as equality, then the 
nonnegative pair (x-0, yo) must satisf-v a pair of eigenvahe problems 
[A L’B’ - IYTq x0 = 0 = [B’UA - @v-l] yo (4.3) 
where HO == 4h”p”. 
Remark 1. If the matrices d L-B’, B’U,4 are positive definite and the non- 
negative equilibrium pair (x0, y”) satisfy (4.3), then the eigenvalue 80 must be 
positive. 
Remark 2. If the matrices -4 VB’U, B’UA V are nonnegative and the equili- 
biium vectors .G’, y0 satisfy the complementary eigenvalue problems (4.3) then 
the eigenvalue 80 must be nonnegative. 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLICATION 
The above formulation of constrained games as equivalent nonlinear programs 
has implications for application in several areas, two of which may be mentioned 
in particular. 
First, it may be applied to normal solutions of a stochastic linear programming 
(LP) model where there is parameter uncertainty. The concept of a normal 
solution of a stochastic LP problem has been recently introduced by Tikhonov 
[17] by means of the supplementary condition that the optimal solution sought 
must be closest in some sense to a preassigned point. For instance let .vo be the 
preassigned in the LP model: max, c’x subject to b = ,4x, .IC > 0 u-here the 
parameters (=1,b, c) are probabilistic and A is m by 12, b is m by I and c is 11 by 1. 
Denoting the distance .X - ,x0 by y and measuring the degree of closeness by 
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variance of the appropriate linear function we obtain the nonlinear program in 
the decision variables y as follows: 
subject to 
where 
minimize JV’ 1 )s 
Y 
v'Ry > k, k > 0 
F = E[(c - EC) (c - EC)‘] 
R = E[(A - Ed)' (A - EA)] 
E = expectation operator. 
(5.1) 
Here the variance of the linear function c’y is minimized subject to a lower 
bound constraint on the variance of b = Ay. It is clear that F and R are sym- 
metric and positive semi-definite, as they are variance-covariance matrices. 
Hence, if there exists an optimal vector y” such that for a given lz ::,- 0 it satisfies 
the eigenvalue problem: 
(I,- A"R)yo =O (5.2) 
then ho must be the minimum eigenvalue, which is real and nonnegative. Some 
results on the generalized eigenvalue problem (5.2) associated with normal 
solutions of stochastic LP models are reported elsewhere [13, 151. 
A special case of the stochastic LP model arises when there are two players, 
the decision maker (player I) and nature (player II), where the first controls the 
mixed strategy vector s >, 0 and the second c > 0. The payoffs are 
Player I: 
Minimize c’ (w& + $- 1;~) , zua > 0. (5.3) 
Player II: 
maximize .2^’ i zLflF - 7 I ,A ,^ ,T j , zq > 0. s (5.4) 
This may be interpreted as follows: given X, the random profit to player II 
is z / x = C’X which has the conditional mean C’X and conditional variance 
.Y’V,N where z and VC are subjective estimate of mean and variance of vector c 
based on past observations of the play and w1 , A are weights. Likewise, for 
player II, the random cost given c is z ( c = X’C which has the conditional mean 
%‘c and conditional variance c’V,c where X. I’, are subjective estimates of mean 
and variance of x based on past observations of the play and z+ , ,L are weights. 
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If the subjective estimates are fulfilled, then x = X, c = E for the two players. 
A joint payoff function may then be defined: 
ma$@n;ze kwc’x - 5 (rx’V,x + c’V,c) 
subject to (5.5) 
wherew,-(1 +k)w,, wZ = w, h = rp and the strategy vectors c, x are not 
necessarily normalized to unity. 
This game is interactive in the sense that each player observes the other 
player’s pattern of play and incorporates his subjective estimates of the mean and 
variance of the other player’s strategy in his conditional payoff function; also 
there is the mutual rationality assumption through c = E, w = x which implies 
that in the long run the subjective estimates are fulfilled. If this latter assumption 
does not hold, one may have to introduce partially controllable strategies in 
terms of the distance p = c - E, 4 = x - 5. 
It is clear from (5.5) that if an optimal solution vector (co, x”) exists for the 
quadratic program (5.5) such that 
kwc” - /uVCxo = 0 
kwx” - /LI,P 2 0 
co, .P 3 0 
(5.6) 
then the point (co, 9’) must satisfy the complementary eigenvalue problems 
(PI - V,V,) x0 = pr - V,V,) co = 0 (5.7) 
where 80 is the optimal eigenvalue associated with ti = rp*/(kw)2. If the strategy 
vectors c, x are assumed partially controllable so that the modified strategies are 
p = x - s,) , q = c - co , where x0 , co are initial probability estimates or pre- 
assigned strategies the nonlinear program (5.5) becomes 
?a: ktzp’q - f (rp’lTgp + q’l’,q). (54 
Any optimal solution (~0, q”) for this program must satisfy the complementary 
eigenvalue problems: 
(PI - v, V,) po = 0 = (PI - VQ V,) qo (5.9) 
where 8” is positive if V, , V, are positive definite and (p”, q”) is unique if, in 
addition CL, r are position scalars. 
A second application of our results arises in problems of optimal design in 
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linear repression experiments [2, 71. Here we have a closed bounded set S in 
k-dimensional space with 
z = /3’s + 24 XES (6-l) 
where u has mean zero and variance uz and the vector x has to be optimally 
chosen. According to the Chebyshev criterion we select a design which mini- 
mizes the masimum variance among linear unbiased estimators for s E S i.e. to 
minimize ma: d(s) (6.2) 
where 
J(x) = x’ vp 
is the variance of the estimate fi’r of x. In experimental design problems, the 
experimenter would have the set S at his disposal and the problem is to choose 
or allocate a given number of selections .v subject to the limits of a given cost. 
In behavioral problems the set S is not ordinarily given and hence there is a 
screening problem in the data set X. Denoting the population mean of the 
observation vector x by p and the population variance by Z the multivariable 
distance between s and p may be characterized by 
D’(x, I*; 2) = (x - p)’ z-y.% - p) (6.3) 
assuming Z to be positive definite. Using suitable sample estimates b, .J? and a 
value E > 0 of the distance measure (6.3) we may therefore set up an optimum 




(x - i;)’ b-&x - p) < 24. (6.4) 
(x - /I)’ 2-1(x - #iI) > E. 
A special case of this problem is, for player I the experimenter: 
subject to 
minimize (*v - i;)’ l$(.v - $) 
(s - fi)’ 2--1(x - fi) = E 
E>O 
(6.5) 
where the optimal vector (x” - @) must satisfy the generalized eigenvalue pro- 
blem 
( L’b - j&&-l) po = 0 (6.6) 
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where p” = x0 - i; and X0 is the optimal value of the multiplier associated with 
the constraint of (6.5). 
It is clear that if vector /3 in (6.1) is controlled by nature, just as x is by the 
experimenter and an analogous interpretation is put on p, then we can set up an 
optimum choice problem for player II, the decision maker as: 
minimize (/3 - f)’ P&3 - p) 
subject to (6.7) 
(#I - p)’ I$‘(/3 - f) = r, r>O 
where y, VB are the mean and variance of the random vector p and their estimates 
are ?, p,j , whereas Vz denotes the variance based on observations 9. Again, the 
optimal vector (/3O - 7) must satisfy- the eigenvalue problem in A0 
(b-2 - X”F;l)*o = 0 
where Q” = /3” - 9 and A0 is the optimal value of the multiplier associated with 
the constraint of (6.7). For long run equilibrium and compatibility of subjective 
estimates by the two players one may have to impose additional conditions like 
fl = /3.9?, .C = x in which case the pair of eigenvalue problems (6.6) and (6.8) 
become complementary. 
Some other applications arising in nonconvex quadratic programs and bilinear 
differential game models have been treated elsewhere [ 1 I, 12, 141. 
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